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研究成果の概要（英文）：We used a Contract& Game Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone Fi
nancial Governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. We derived
 the conditions for optimizing the EU's current allocation of authority, Monetary Centralization and Fisca
l Decentralization, and found that what is effective is "contingency dependent governance" based on "relat
ive sovereignty," where there is a division of authority as the basic structure and the main body governs 
the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. We focused on how financial markets put pres
sure on the EU in the euro crisis and how this led the EU to build more robust institutions, and approache
d this by applying the Coase's theory of externalities. Further, applying the framework of an entry deterr
ence game conceptually, we analyzed how the EU, facing challenges from the markets, moved to build fiscal 
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